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Showing posts from April, 2016

FHIR - Input Validation

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Updated: Vadim Peretokin advises on the FHIR chat : You're better off in the world if you know about this stuff though. https://www.hacksplaining.com/exercises lists some XML-related vulnerabilities and is pretty easy to learn from. It has happened again. This time Michael Lawley reported that the HAPI reference implementation was susceptible to XXE attack -- Grahame's email to the FHIR list: Yesterday, Michael Lawley reported that the HAPI reference implementation had a security flaw in that it was susceptible to the XXE attack. Those of you interested in details about XXE can see here: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XML_External_Entity_(XXE)_Processing The various XML parsers in the the various reference implementations are variably affected by this; we are releasing patches for them now. Specifically, with regard to the java reference implementation, it has always ignored DTD definitions, so is immune. Any newly released versions will change to stop ignored DTD definitions...

Consent given to authorized representative

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I asked for use-cases on the FHIR chat so that I could model them. This effort to model use-cases is useful as it helps test the theory with reality. So the next one I got was from Andrew Torres who asks about an authorized representative. Have you thought about the authorized representative use-case? I think we spoke about this briefly at the WGM in January. Patient facing applications will need the ability to understand who is accessing data, and the app will need to understand what data that person can see. An example use-case is a child going to a children's hospital doesn't grant consent. The parent will be his authorized representative to view patient health information. So in a patient portal or an application the parent would be able to view data because they are authorized to do so. The authorization, or contract as we have modeled it in FHIR, would expire, while the relationship will always exist. There are a couple of things worthy of modeling. There are also some t...

HL7 v2 vs FHIR

I was in a discussion around HL7 v2 vs FHIR lately. The technical merits of FHIR were not being debated. The technical merits were understood and agreed. The only outstanding difference is network bandwidth efficiency and processing expense. There is really nothing one can do in FHIR that one can't do in HL7 v2. Yet the question persisted, what is the reason why FHIR will win over a more compact solution like HL7 v2? Simply: The people that know HL7 v2 are retiring.  At best there is a small fixed pool of people today that understand HL7 v2; while the need to enable Interoperability in Healthcare is expanding fast. The new developers come to the healthcare world ready to use the technologies that FHIR is based on. They can be productive right away. Yet to re-train them on HL7 v2 is expensive and time consuming. The efficiency of the network bandwidth is not critical, Networks get faster, CPUs get faster, the technology will overcome. The productivity of new developers is critical....

Patient ID is critical to Enabling Privacy

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A very short article  this week really brings the problem of Patient Identity to a point. Specifically this: Dr. Charles Jaffe, CEO of standards development organization Health Level Seven International , said Tuesday at the 13th annual World Health Care Congress in Washington that Kaiser Permanente Southern California had records of 10,000 people named Maria Gonzales. Ten thousand. That is 10,000 opportunities for a FALSE match, aka a false-positive. That is where the data of the wrong person is being used to treat someone. From a Medical Practice, and Medical Safety perspective this scares me to no end! But that is not my focus in this article. Privacy Enabling is. I know that the people in Healthcare really want this problem resolved. However in the USA we are up against a forbiddance of USA Government funding of a national patient ID. There was concerns that it would present a Privacy risk. I however think that by not having a national patient ID we have a much worse Privacy r...

Consent to grant read access to a specific types of FHIR Resource

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Grahame got this question on FHIR Consent , and forward it to me to answer. Question: I am using the FHIR Contract resource ( https://www.hl7.org/fhir/contract.html ) to convey the patient consent for a provider to access specific FHIR resources (Ex: Observation, MedicationOrder, DiagnosticReport…). Which field in the Contract resource can be used to specify the list of consented FHIR resources? The short answer is that today this is unclear as there are many ways to do it. This is a problem that I struggle with and intend to use this blog article to help narrow the solution space so as to make progress in the modeling. The Privacy Consent Directive (PCD) Implementation Guide is where the CBCC and Security workgroups are building the solution. We are making progress, but not as much as I would like. We tend to spend far too much time re-arranging the chairs, and too little time making solutions. I like the Question, as it gives a concrete thing to focus on. Background  I cover th...

Patient Matching as a Science

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A critical science in healthcare that has many dimensions and use-cases or misuse-cases. De-Identification -- Break the binding: I have been involved lately with a few De-Identification projects . To be complete  De-Identification, Anonymization, and Pseudonymization . Where the goal is to end up with a set of data that is useful for some research project, yet has as low of a Privacy risk to the individuals for whom the data is about. These efforts go through great length to remove Direct Identifiers, those values that are publicly known to uniquely identify a single individual. For example a Driver’s License number, Passport number, Medical Records Number, Email Address, Personal Phone Number, etc. These efforts then struggle with the Indirect Identifiers, also known as Quasi-Identifiers. These are values that are not unique to that individual, but do describe a narrow aspect about the individual. For example a birth day, gender, postal/zip code, etc. There is also the '...